

# **A Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of the Organization for National Security**

**The Military Combatant Commands  
and  
State Department Regional Bureaus**

DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
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**Colonel Michael Pasquarett  
Professor James Kievit**

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**A BLUEPRINT FOR A BOLD RESTRUCTURING  
OF THE ORGANIZATION  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

**Phase One:  
The Military Combatant Commands  
and  
State Department Regional Bureaus**

**Colonel Michael Pasquarett**

**Professor James Kievit**

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## **FOREWORD**

Throughout history the proficient application of combined arms on the ground battlefield has been a key to tactical success, and so military leaders and institutions have expended tremendous intellectual and physical resources to ensure their organizations and subordinate leaders were capable of such integrated activities. As just one example, today the vast infrastructure of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command exists primarily to ensure that no other land forces in the world will be more proficient at combined arms than are American forces.

By the second half of the 20th century, it was clear that integrated joint operations were an imperative for operational success. So, almost 50 years ago, American leaders and institutions began the expenditure of intellectual and physical resources necessary to ensure that U.S. military forces would have the required joint capabilities. While it would be premature to claim complete success, it appears from the evidence of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 that the organizations and processes created during the Cold War era have laid the foundation for effective joint force integration and operation. America possesses the best joint force elements in the world today; and still further improvements can be expected from full implementation of the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act (better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act).

Unfortunately, the latter years of this century have amply demonstrated that strategic and operational success in the 21st century will demand more than combined-arms or joint force operations. It will require fully integrated interagency action at every step of the national security process, from conception through planning and execution. Yet, in today's constrained environment, such integration cannot be attained via increased resource expenditures. Instead, the necessary effectiveness must be accomplished through efficient modification of existing U.S. national security organizations.

This paper, the first of a projected series on this issue, presents a bold proposal for launching such a modification. Examining the U.S. regional national security organizations, the Department of Defense's combatant commands and the Department of State's regional bureaus, the authors believe a significantly different structure would better fit the realities of the emerging world environment. They argue that the combination of a better alignment of Department of Defense and Department of State geographic areas of responsibility with a revised subordinate combatant command structure would improve both the joint and interagency focus, as well as make more efficient use of national security resources.

The authors recognize that not all will agree with their analyses, conclusions, or recommendations. The purpose of the paper is to promote dialogue toward creating a more effective U.S. organization for national security. It is hoped that the ensuing exchange of ideas will help to create a structure which can continue to be called upon to serve the interests of the nation in an uncertain future.

Future papers in this series will examine the national security roles and structures of the internal organizations of the Department of Defense and the Military Service Departments, of the Department of State, and of other national level agencies. In each case, the objective will be to increase the convergence of capabilities for effective implementation of U.S. policy.

The Center for Strategic Leadership strongly encourages readers to participate in a continuing discussion of U.S. national security organizations and the challenges the future holds.



DOUGLAS B. CAMPBELL  
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# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## **Introduction.**

This paper recommends bold reorganizations of major portions of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Department of State (DoS), as a first step in an even broader restructuring of all U.S. national security organizations. The restructuring proposed in this first phase is designed not primarily to change U.S. policy *making*, but rather to increase the effectiveness of U.S. policy *implementation*.

The analysis proceeds from three premises. First, the current national security structure, while effective during the period of the Cold War, does not best suit present needs. Second, a window of opportunity for change now is open because of a diminished threat of military hostilities and advances in information technology. Third, the foreseeable future holds a continuing decline in resources available for national security purposes — so the choice is to decide to restructure for effectiveness now, or have later restructuring forced by those whose major concern simply may be resource savings.

## **Background.**

The present DoD combatant command structure is essentially a product of World War II, refined for the Cold War. The present DoS structure has even older roots. Yet both the international and domestic states of affairs have changed drastically in the past decade. First, the world military situation obviously is altered, with the elimination of the Warsaw Pact. Second, the international diplomatic situation has shifted, with the U.S. the only superpower — but with perhaps reduced regional influence. Third, the domestic political and resource situation is also different. These three major changes are creating a new, or at least significantly different, environment within which U.S. national security policy must be implemented more effectively.

## **Opportune Time to Change.**

Now is the opportune time to consider and undertake major change in the structure of our national security organizations. The decline in the immediate threat of military confrontation makes possible reconsideration of the balance among diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military activities as instruments of American foreign policy. Additionally, state-of-the-art collaborative planning tools to link policy and decision makers in Washington, DC to policy implementors in forward areas are available. It is, therefore, an appropriate time to seize an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of U.S. policy implementation while at the same time improving the allocation of scarce resources.

This paper focuses on the immediately achievable: improving the alignment between the Department of State bureau system and the unified combatant commands of the Department of Defense, and the restructuring of those commands to improve their effectiveness and make better use of available resources.

## **Improved Alignment of DoS Regional Bureaus and DoD Regional Commands.**

The best national security policy is integrated — diplomatically, economically, culturally, and militarily. Realigning the geographic responsibilities of the DoD regional combatant commands and the DoS political affairs bureaus to match up theater-level actors more closely is a first step toward achieving the required integration.

The paper examines three possible options:

- A reduction of the five existing DoD regional commands to three aligned with a slight modification of the existing six DoS regional bureaus;
- A redesign of both the DoD and DoS regional systems along “cultural” influences; or

- A retention of five DoD regional commands, with revision of their geographic responsibilities; aligned with a modified five DoS regional bureau structure.

The third option is recommended as providing the best balance among effectiveness and resource requirements.

### **Improving Joint and Interagency Planning and Execution.**

Increased theater-level requirements to deal with ambiguity, in-depth mission selection and analysis, and potential interagency contributions (rather than simply focusing on properly organizing and harnessing U.S. military resources) call for a reexamination of the organization of large service-component headquarters subordinate to the combatant commands. The educational and experience base of the officer corps and service responses to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 have combined to greatly increase the number of fully-qualified joint officers available to serve in key positions on the combatant commands' staffs. Reducing or eliminating most of the existing subordinate headquarters of the regional combatant commands will improve the effectiveness of those commands, more efficiently use defense resources, and potentially reduce overall resource requirements significantly. Instead of service component headquarters, improved combatant command staffs, combined with the creation of Operational Planning Group (OPG) organizations and standing Joint Task Force headquarters, will assure effective policy implementation.

An Operational Planning Group is an interagency “virtual corporation” which will:

- Focus on accomplishment of a specific regional or functional mission,
- Bring the expertise of government and nongovernment interagency actors together with military strategic and operational planners and operators to improve the coordinated application of all elements of national power,

- Increase the knowledge and understanding of military power among interagency players,
- Expose a larger number of interagency actors to each others planning processes, and
- Improve the transition from planning to execution.

Standing Joint Task Forces will replace service components as the musculature of the new DoD combatant command structure. The availability of modern information technology will allow the combatant command staff or US-based organizations to perform the “housekeeping” and logistical tasks for the JTF which the service component headquarters formerly handled. The Joint Task Force is a more flexible organization than a single service component organization, more able to adjust quickly to changes in mission requirements. Thus, JTFs can ensure the effective execution of U.S. policy without the resource redundancy found in multiple service component headquarters.

### **Extending the Reorganization to the DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

OPGs and standing JTFs apply equally well to the functional combatant commands. The real issue for these commands, therefore, is how to most efficiently organize them in concert to reduce redundancy, exploit information technology, and make the best use of resources.

The paper examines three possible options:

- Combining USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM into a single headquarters; and requiring the individual military service department headquarters to reassume the force provider responsibilities currently tasked to USACOM,
- Combining USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM into a single headquarters; and retaining a combined force-provider and regional command similar to the current USACOM.

- Combining USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM into a single headquarters; and creating a joint U.S. FORCES COMMAND (USFORCECOM) to act as force provider.

The third option is recommended because it:

- Provides a strong focus on joint preparation and training since the force provider is a unified command with a joint perspective;
- Relieves the force provider of simultaneous responsibility for a geographic region; and
- Potentially provides some resource savings.

## Conclusions.

Now is an opportune time to begin the restructuring of America's national security apparatus. The potential for resource savings, at a time when demand for scarce and declining resources is increasing, is enormous; and a window of opportunity is wide open. Information Age communications allow the United States to push the American agenda. At the same time strategic risk is reduced. Perhaps most importantly, the need to increase interagency coordination and meet the challenges of the newly emerging socio-cultural-diplomatic-economic-environmental-military universe is clear.

Accomplishment of the proposed restructuring will mean that the U.S. national security team will more effectively implement national security policy, and will make more efficient use of national security resources. Among the significant advantages of the proposed structures:

- Alignment of the DoD regional combatant commands with the DoS political affairs bureaus and incorporation of the Operational Planning Group concept will establish interagency operations as a focal point throughout the training, planning, and execution cycles.

- Staffing Operational Planning Groups with the most talented and competent interagency personnel will ensure that an integrated national security policy perspective is incorporated into every operation from situation assessment through final execution.
- Designated Joint Task Forces and Operational Planning Groups will be trained and certified by a single unified command (USFORCECOM), which will ensure a uniformly high standard of joint training.
- Eliminating or streamlining many of the current combatant commands' subordinate command headquarters may allow the redirection of some personnel spaces to more productive areas with the operating forces.

## **Recommendations.**

First, that the Department of Defense and the Department of State study and develop measures to implement a restructuring of the regional national security structures along the lines of five DoD regional combatant commands, each aligned with a single Department of State regional bureau.

Second, that the Department of Defense and the Military Services study and develop measures to implement a restructuring of the DoD combatant command structure incorporating four functional combatant commands; and incorporating the combination of subordinate Joint Task Forces and Operational Planning Groups within both functional and regional commands.

Third, that the President direct that a Task Force be established to examine alternatives to strengthen the effectiveness of the *overall* U.S. organization for national security.

# **A BLUEPRINT FOR A BOLD RESTRUCTURING OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

## **Phase One: The Military Combatant Commands and State Department Regional Bureaus**

### **Introduction.**

Today, I want to talk with you about combining diplomacy and force to advance Americas interests and ideals.

—U.S. Secretary of State  
Warren Christopher<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to recommend bold, some might argue radical, reorganizations of major portions of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Department of State (DoS), as a first step in an even broader restructuring of all U.S. national security organizations.

Why change major components of a national security structure which, with only minor alterations, has worked reasonably successfully for nearly 50 years? The analysis proceeds from three premises. First, the current national security structure, while effective during the period of the Cold War, does not best suit present needs. Better options exist for promoting and protecting U.S. interests, especially when considering the peacetime application of military capabilities and how America deals with the ambiguous and disparate military threats of the new world environment. Second, a window of opportunity for change is open now in that the danger of widespread military hostilities has diminished; and advances in information technology, both extant and projected, permit the possibility of a restructuring to improve effectiveness while simultaneously reducing resource demands. The latter is particularly important, because the

third premise is that the foreseeable future holds a continuing decline in resources available for national security purposes — so the choice may well be to decide how to restructure for maximum effectiveness now, or eventually have a restructuring forced by those whose major concern simply may be resource savings.

Full consideration of the national security impact of these three premises calls for examining the entire spectrum of foreign policy and national security organizations and agencies, including intelligence and law enforcement organizations. Such a comprehensive examination must be accomplished soon. This initial paper, however, focuses on the immediately achievable: improving the alignment between the Department of State bureau system and the unified combatant commands of the Department of Defense, and the restructuring of those commands to improve their effectiveness and make better use of available resources.

The proposed restructuring is designed not primarily to change U.S. policy *making*, but rather to increase the effectiveness of U.S. policy *implementation*. Restructuring to improve interagency action between and within the Department of Defense combatant commands and the Department of State bureaus is recommended as phase one primarily due to its relative ease of implementation, relative lack of controversy, and potential for immediate payback. Future phases, to be addressed in future papers, will recommend possible additional restructuring of the Military Service Departments and the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and State and of other strategic-level national security organizations. Each phase of the total proposed restructuring process, however, stands on its own merits and can be implemented independently. Therefore, it is neither necessary nor recommended to delay implementing the organizational changes proposed within this paper.


## **Background.**

### **The DoD Unified Commands.**

A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and is composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, . . .

—Joint Pub 0-2<sup>2</sup>

The present DoD combatant command structure is essentially a product of World War II, refined for the Cold War. Its foundation was the various theater commands at the end of World War II, and that foundation subsequently has been built upon through the National Security Act of 1947, the 1949 amendment to that act, the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, and finally the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA-86).<sup>3</sup> Throughout, the principal goal behind the organization of the various command structures of the Department of Defense has been the “integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services [Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force] to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions.”<sup>4</sup> The current U.S. Unified Command Plan (UCP) identifies nine Department of Defense Unified Combatant Commands.<sup>5</sup> Four of these commands are functional commands (see figure 1),




**Figure 1. DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

four are geographic or regional commands (see figure 2),




**Figure 2. DoD Geographic or Regional Combatant Commands.**

and one is both a functional and a geographic or regional command (see figure 3).<sup>6</sup>



**Figure 3. DoD Geographic and Functional Combatant Command.**

The UCP assigns each geographic combatant command a specific area of responsibility (AOR) for the planning and conduct of military operations in support of the U.S. national security and military strategies (see figure 4).



**Figure 4. DoD Geographic Combatant Command AORs.**


Under the current UCP, exactly as throughout the Cold War, the territories of the former Soviet Union and continental North America (except for Alaska) remain the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### **The DoS Bureau System.**

The Department of State ... advances U.S. objectives and interests in shaping a freer, more secure, and more prosperous world through formulating, representing, and implementing the Presidents foreign policies. ... The Department of State carries out its mission through overseas posts; its Washington, DC, headquarters; and other offices in the U.S.


—DoS Internet Home Page<sup>7</sup>

To implement U.S. foreign policy the Department of State, similar to the Department of Defense, has created both functional bureaus (see figure 5)



**Figure 5. DoD Functional Bureaus.**


and geographic or regional bureaus (see figure 6).



**Figure 6. DoS Regional Bureaus.**

The specified mission of these regional bureaus is to “coordinate the conduct of U.S. foreign relations” in their assigned areas of the world.<sup>8</sup> U.S. posts supervised by these regional bureaus provide “in-depth analyses of the politics, economic trends, and social forces at work in foreign countries” for use by other elements of the government, including the DoD combatant commands.<sup>9</sup>

During the Cold War, while negotiations related to arms control like SALT, START, INF, MBFR, and CFE naturally received a great deal of media attention, the greatest proportion of the Department of States daily diplomatic work — and therefore most of its organization — had little to do directly with the Soviet Union. Instead, DoS’ primary priority was to continue to pursue broader U.S. interests with the multitude of countries worldwide. Accordingly, the geographic responsibilities of its political affairs bureau structure reflected economic, cultural, and linguistic, as well as ideological, influences (see figure 7).<sup>10</sup>



**Figure 7. Geographic Responsibilities  
of DoS Regional Bureaus.**

## A Changed and Changing World.

The Department of Defense's task of protecting U.S. worldwide interests has become exceedingly more complex and demanding ... This trend has increased the seriousness of structural deficiencies within the U.S. military establishment. The gap between today's structural arrangements and the organizational needs of the Department of Defense is continuously widening.

—Staff Report to Senate  
Armed Services Committee<sup>11</sup>

The similarities of today's DoD combatant command structure and DoS bureau system to those of the Cold War era are intriguing considering that both the international and domestic states of affairs have changed drastically in the past decade. First, obviously the world military situation is altered. When the current frameworks of the Department of Defense combatant command structure were erected, there existed a confrontational bipolar world. There were two ideologically opposed superpowers, heavily armed with both nuclear and conventional weapons. The possibility that any misstep could generate an incredible global military confrontation was the fundamental backdrop to every action in the international system. The DoD command structure was accordingly designed to deal with an identifiable, global, military threat. Today — after the “fall of the Wall,” the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the acceptance of free-market economies in the territories of the former Soviet Union — that threat of *global* war, if not entirely eliminated, certainly has diminished significantly. It has been supplanted, however, by diffuse, diverse, and often ambiguous military threats, and aggravated by a proliferation of relatively inexpensive, accurate, and highly destructive weapons held by numerous countries and terrorist organizations. Individually, and probably not even in aggregate, these threats do not begin to approach the scale of that formerly posed by the Soviet Union; nonetheless the world cannot yet be said to be a safe place. Combined, all these factors have evoked changes in U.S. national strategy, from “containment” of communism and defense of the “free world” against a large-scale quantifiable military threat, toward active “engagement” — not infrequently with military

forces — to maintain stability, encourage economic growth, promote environmental security, and foster democratization, and toward “preventive defense” against a wide array of potential opponents.

Second, the international diplomatic situation has shifted. The United States is (and likely will be for the foreseeable future) the only superpower. As such, it may be a focal point for addressing many of the world’s existing or emerging problems. This does not, however, automatically mean that U.S. viewpoints will be universally adopted nor that U.S. policies will be implemented easily. Indeed, the opposite may be the case. In the absence of superpower confrontation, some previously less powerful actors on the world scene may increasingly perceive that a better opportunity exists for advancing their individual interests. Simultaneously, without the fear of an opposing, repressive, and totalitarian superpower, U.S. allies and friends may perceive a decreased requirement to support or maintain a single coalition viewpoint on every issue.

Third, the domestic situation is also different. Elimination of the more obvious Cold War threat invokes reduced support for defense expenditures and an increased demand that scarce resources be committed to domestic endeavors. An increasingly inward focus of the American electorate eventually may translate into profoundly less support for resource commitments overseas. While nothing in current trends should cause anyone to believe that the American people will ever refuse to fund an adequate structure to meet national security requirements, national security resources clearly must be expended in a manner to achieve the greatest effect.

These three major changes are creating a new, or at least significantly different, environment within which U.S. national security policy must be implemented more effectively.

## **Opportune Time to Change.**

Art is long, life short, judgment difficult, opportunity transient.

—Goethe<sup>12</sup>

Even as governments, organizations, and individuals try to determine how best to adapt to or, better yet, shape the new environment, many old structures and practices prove resistant to change. Both the U.S. Department of Defense combatant commands and the Department of State regional bureaus are examples of structures which thus far have undergone only minor modifications.<sup>13</sup> In particular, as already alluded to, the overseas geographic areas assigned to the present DoD regional combatant commands (figure 4) and the DoS regional political affairs bureaus (figure 7) do not appear to be significantly different from those of the Cold War period of a decade ago, despite the profound changes which have occurred in the international security environment.

Yet now is the opportune time to consider and, where appropriate, undertake major change. The decline in the immediate threat of military confrontation not only makes possible reconsideration of the balance among diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military activities as instruments of American foreign policy, but also provides an opportunity to accept the risk of disruptions associated with modifying organizations and processes. Additionally, state-of-the-art collaborative planning tools can now effectively link policy and decision makers in Washington, DC to policy implementors in forward areas. This provides an opportunity to eliminate redundancies while increasing interaction during the planning and execution processes.

In time of major transition *wise* choices made early can pay dividends for decades to come. Now, a moment of relative peace and security, is not the time for the United States to rest on past laurels or passively await future developments. It is, instead, the appropriate time to *act* — to seize an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of U.S. policy implementation in the emerging world environment while at the same time improving the allocation of scarce resources.

Specifically, three immediate modifications to the current national security structure are proposed:

- Align the geographic areas of responsibility of the Department of Defense's regional commands and the Department of State's regional bureaus to improve the convergence between regional and global diplomatic and military planning and activities;
- Introduce a combination of standing Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters and Operational Planning Group (OPG) organizations into the structure of the DoD regional combatant commands, and consolidate the service component headquarters of those commands into the combatant command staffs. Together, these actions will improve interagency planning, increase the focus on operational needs, and reduce resource inefficiencies; and
- Revise the DoD functional combatant command structure to increase joint planning and training, make better use of resources, and improve support to the regional commands.

### **Improved Alignment of DoS Regional Bureaus and DoD Regional Commands.**

In today's world, when American interests are more global than ever, our national security requires the wise use of force and diplomacy together. Diplomacy that is not backed by the credible threat or use of force can be hollow — and ultimately dangerous. But if we do not use diplomacy to promote our vital interests, we will surely find ourselves defending them on the battlefield. Today, in more places and circumstances than ever before, we must get the balance right. ... The lesson of our time is that we must combine force and diplomacy when our important interests are at stake.

—U.S. Secretary of State  
Warren Christopher<sup>14</sup>

During the Cold War, the United States could accept a certain degree of divergence in the focus of the State and Defense departments. The need for containment of an expansionist Soviet


Union was widely accepted, so resources generally were provided for both Department of State and Department of Defense activities. Although the scale of the overall national effort required was immense, the DoD was aided by the fact that the overarching threat to national survival clearly was Soviet-directed military power. This meant DoD could design its combatant headquarters and operating forces to focus almost exclusively on that military threat, and so prioritization for defense resource expenditures was obvious. Nonetheless, even during the Cold War, an incoherent focus of all theater-level national security structures occasionally found the United States not fully prepared for unexpected regional requirements or conflicts. But in general, for the past five decades America's vital interests were protected even if the Department of State and the Department of Defense planners and actors were not always focused on the same regional issues.

Today, however, the national strategy of worldwide "engagement" and a reduction in both Department of State and Department of Defense resources compel consistent, integrated DoS and DoD planning and execution. Shaping the emerging universe into a form that will perpetuate and advance U.S. values, as well as protect Americas vital interests, requires the carefully controlled convergence of social, cultural, economic, environmental, diplomatic and military activities. In today's world, at any given time military threats are simultaneously nowhere and everywhere. At the same time, it is possible to advance American ideals and values on a broad scale rather than simply protecting vital interests from military aggression. Therefore, the best national security policy truly is integrated—diplomatically, economically, culturally, and militarily. The direct use of force is, and should remain, an instrument of last resort. Nevertheless, throughout the spectrum of competition and conflict the existence, availability, presence and/or non-violent application of U.S. military power in its many facets can frequently be a powerful persuader to assist the promotion of U.S. goals. Moreover, success in avoiding the need to engage in the actual application of violence often rests in timely intelligence and early action or intervention while circumstances are still at the pre-hostilities stage. To identify and accomplish the necessary actions effectively and efficiently, Department of Defense and


Department of State theater-level actors need to be integrated to work together. Realigning the DoD regional combatant commands and the DoS political affairs bureaus to match up more closely is a first step toward achieving the required integration.

Closer alignment of the Department of Defense's regional command's geographic areas of responsibility with those of the Department of State's regional bureau system will help make possible a greater convergence of U.S. foreign policy efforts. This paper examines three possible options:


- A reduction of the five existing DoD regional commands into three aligned with a slight modification of the existing six DoS regional bureaus;




- A redesign of both the DoD and DoS regional systems along "cultural" influences; or



- A retention of five DoD regional commands, with revision of their geographic responsibilities; aligned with a modified five DoS regional bureau structure.



**Option One.** Create three “super-CINCdoms” by consolidating the five existing regional combatant commands (see figure 8) and align them with a slightly modified six DoS regional bureau structure.<sup>15</sup>



**Figure 8. Option One -- Three "Super-CINCs".**

In this option a new United States Eastern Command (USEASTCOM)\* would encompass generally the current United States European Command (USEUCOM) and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). It would be aligned with the two existing Department of State bureaus dealing with African and Near Eastern Affairs, and with a modification of the existing DoS Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. This bureau would be restructured slightly, transferring its Canadian responsibilities over into the Bureau of Inter-American affairs. Historically, of course, aligning Canada with European affairs made eminent sense in recognition of her special relationship first with the United Kingdom, then with the Commonwealth, and later, during the Cold War, with NATO. Today, however, economic and trade ties in particular argue that Canada is bound much more closely to and should be considered an integral part of the western, "Americas" hemisphere.<sup>16</sup> A new United States Americas Command (USAMERICOM), consolidating the current United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AORs, would encompass most of the western hemisphere. It would align with the existing Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs which, as already noted, would pick up the responsibilities for Canadian affairs previously held by the DoS' European and Canadian Affairs bureau. Finally, a new United States Western Command (USWESTCOM) would replace the current United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Its AOR would geographically align with the two existing Department of State bureaus dealing with East Asian and Pacific and South Asian Affairs.

Although there are advantages to this arrangement, particularly in terms of potential resource savings through the elimination of two major unified headquarters, it also possesses significant problems, particularly in terms of span of control for USEASTCOM. USEASTCOM's proposed AOR includes the newly independent

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\* Suggested new command or bureau names in all the options are proposed for discussion purposes only.

states of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and all of Africa — each a hotbed of diplomatic and military intervention in recent years (see Table 1).


USAMERICOM	USEASTCOM	USWESTCOM
Cuba	Algeria	Afghanistan
Columbia	Armenia	China
Ecuador	Azerbaijan	India
Haiti**	Bosnia**	Korea
Mexico	Burundi	Pakistan
Peru	Chechnya	Sri Lanka
	Cyprus	
	Georgia	
	Iran	
	Iraq**	
	Israel	
	Liberia	
	Libya	
	Nigeria	
	Russia	
	Rwanda	
	Sinai**	
	Somalia	
	Sudan	
	Tajikistan	
	Zaire	

\*\*Ongoing U.S. contingency/peace operations

**Table 1. Potential "Flashpoints" in Option 1  
Proposed Combatant Command AORs.**

Even as the information age allows faster communication between echelons of command, it simultaneously increases the quantity of information to be analyzed and acted upon. Additional and more detailed information about potential issues and trouble spots becomes available every day, and this information usually increases rather than decreases the alternatives a decision maker should consider. In a fragmented, ambiguous world, a decision maker with too broad an area of responsibility may quickly be overwhelmed simply by the need to prioritize inputs, much less decide upon actions.

**Option Two.** Replace both the five existing DoD regional combatant commands and the six existing DoS regional bureaus with new regional structures which reflect specific socio-economic-cultural-religious similarities (see figure 9).




**Figure 9. Option Two -- Four "Cultural CINCs".**

In this option a new DoD combatant command, perhaps entitled the United States Western Command (USWESTCOM), would incorporate the majority of the “western” world in its AOR. Its new DoS bureau counterpart (e.g., Bureau of Western Affairs) would include most of the current Department of States European and Canadian bureau, as well as those offices from other bureaus currently responsible for “western” nations (i.e., Australia, New Zealand). Another new DoD combatant command, perhaps entitled the United States African and South American Command (USAFSACOM), would focus on the frequently similar crises and issues (human rights, civil-military relations, humanitarian relief, etc.) arising out of the developing countries of Africa and South America.<sup>17</sup> Its new Department of State bureau counterpart would include most of the offices of the current DoS African and Inter-American Affairs bureaus. A third new DoD combatant command, perhaps entitled the United States Near Eastern Command (USNECOM), would focus on the Arabian-Islamic world. Its new Department of State bureau counterpart would include the majority of the offices of the current DoS Near Eastern Affairs and South Asian Affairs bureaus, as well as those offices from other bureaus currently

responsible for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Indonesia. Finally, the fourth new DoD combatant command, perhaps entitled the United States Far Eastern Command (USFECOM), would focus on the Sino-Japanese-Korean and the remaining Pacific Island oceanic regions. Its new Department of State bureau counterpart would be a modification of the current DoS East Asia and Pacific Affairs bureau taking into account the elements transferred to the other replacement DoS bureaus.

Such an arrangement would seem to fit with some recent theories on future conflict, and might permit the DoD and the DoS regional organizations to focus on some mission types (such as humanitarian relief) which occur more frequently in particular AORs. However, it does possess significant drawbacks. First, it creates significant near-term strategic risk because it requires the greatest disruption of current DoD command arrangements and DoS bureau structures. Second, USNECOM and USAFSACOM are likely to suffer both span of control and mission overburden problems, similar to those of USEASTCOM in Option One. Third, it is very difficult to design a perfect cultural or "civilization" division of the world. Numerous countries in all corners of the globe would fit into one alignment based on religion, another based on economic system, and still a third based on social practices or susceptibility to particular types of crises or issues. For example, should Indonesia really be in USNECOM because of its Islamic religious majority, or should it be in USFECOM because of its close cultural similarities and existing treaty ties to the other SE and SW Asian nations? In addition, attempting such a division is likely to inflame cultural, ethnic, and religious passions domestically, potentially increasing the difficulty in obtaining support for diplomatic or military activities and exacerbating American civil-military relations. Finally, and perhaps most critically, the emerging role of cultural, religious, or social commonality in determining future conflict as hypothesized by some analysts remains questionable to others equally knowledgeable or experienced, who argue that ideology, nationalism, government, geography and economics can still play the dominant role.<sup>18</sup>

**Option Three.** Retain five DoD regional commands, but revise their geographic responsibilities to align with a modified five DoS regional bureau structure (see figure 10).



**Figure 10. Option Three -- Five "Aligned CINCs".**

In this option, similar to Option One, a new United States Americas Command (USAMERICOM), consolidating the current United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AORs, would encompass most of the western hemisphere. It would align with the existing Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which would pick up the responsibilities for Canadian affairs previously held by the DoS' European and Canadian Affairs bureau for the reasons previously discussed. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) would be divested of the African portions of its current AOR. The revised USEUCOM would encompass the European portion of the current USEUCOM area of responsibility, and would also assume responsibility for the territories of the former Soviet Union (currently a Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility). This would align USEUCOMs geographic responsibilities with those of the DoS

Bureau of European Affairs (retitled after having transferred its Canadian responsibilities to the Bureau of Inter-American affairs). A new U.S. African Command (USAFRICOM) would assume responsibility for that portion of Africa aligned with the DoS Bureau of African Affairs. The North African portion of the former USEUCOM AOR would be combined with the major portion of the current USCENTCOM AOR, and USCENTCOM would be retitled as the U.S. Near Eastern Command (USNECOM). As configured, USNECOM would thus be aligned with the DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, which would acquire the offices dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan from the current Bureau of South Asian Affairs. Finally, USPACOM, renamed the United States Far Eastern Command (USFECOM), would retain responsibility for the remaining portions of the current USPACOM AOR. USFECOM's AOR is geographically aligned with a DoS Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, created by combining the remaining offices of the Bureau of South Asian Affairs with the existing Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

This third, and recommended, option will best integrate U.S. military power with U.S. economic and diplomatic efforts throughout the world, and will allow U.S. military regional command personnel to focus culturally and linguistically to the same degree as do Department of State operatives. The division of the current USEUCOM AOR into two will allow the separation of NATO issues, on which Europeans and Americans tend more often than not to generally agree, from those of the African continent, on which they often do not but about which the Europeans feel considerable ownership. This option potentially eases span of control problems (see Table 2) and provides less disruption of present DoS bureau and DoD combatant command operations, while permitting greater integration of Department of State and Department of Defense efforts.

When adopted, Option Three provides the potential to improve the effectiveness of U.S. policy implementation without requiring the expenditure of additional resources. But revising the DoD and DoS geographic areas of responsibility to improve cooperation is only a

<b>USAMERICOM</b>	<b>USEUCOM</b>	<b>USAFRICOM</b>	<b>USNECOM</b>	<b>USFECOM</b>
Cuba	Armenia	Burundi	Afghanistan	China
Columbia	Azerbaijan	Liberia	Algeria	India
Ecuador	Bosnia**	Nigeria	Iran	Korea
Haiti**	Chechnya	Rwanda	Iraq**	Sri Lanka
Mexico	Cyprus	Somalia	Israel	
Peru	Georgia	Sudan	Libya	
	Russia	Zaire	Pakistan	
	Tajikistan		Sinai**	


\*\*Ongoing U.S. contingency/peace operations.

**Table 2. Potential "Flashpoints" in Option 3  
Proposed Combatant Command AORs.**

beginning. The next critical step is to improve integrated joint and interagency planning and execution through the incorporation of a combination of Operational Planning Groups and standing Joint Task Forces, and consolidation of the service component headquarters functions, in the DoD regional combatant commands.

### **Improving Joint and Interagency Planning and Execution.**

The present implementing subordinate headquarters of the regional combatant commands are, for the most part, large single-military-service component organizations (see figure 11).



**Figure 11. Subordinate Commands  
of the DoD Regional Combatant Commands.**

These service component headquarters in the regional combatant commands were created primarily to fulfill four functions:

- To provide service-specific expertise and advice otherwise lacking in the combatant command,
- To communicate service requirements and capabilities to the CINCs and CINC requirements to the service departments,
- To plan and execute service logistical support programs, and
- To coordinate and supervise forward deployed forces infrastructure and basing issues with host governments.

For the past fifty years, military service component headquarters were an acceptable organizational design to fulfill these functions. There were relatively few qualified “joint” officers, so the provision of service specific advice to the CINCs’ staffs was prudent. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA-86), military service manpower policies tended to result in the most talented officers remaining in service-specific assignments rather than going to joint combatant command staff positions. Moreover, during the Cold War the external mission was unambiguous, and so the fact that service component headquarters staffs may be essentially “one dimensional” in vision was not fatal. The requirement was not to deal with ambiguity, in-depth mission selection and analysis, or potential interagency contributions; instead the primary need was simply to focus on properly organizing and harnessing U.S. military resources. Additionally, the combination of relatively large forward deployed forces, truly massive reinforcing deployments, and relatively short-range limited bandwidth communications and computing technologies also made large forward logistical and infrastructure planning headquarters prudent.

The situation is different today. The passage of time, the educational and experience base of the officer corps, and the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 have combined to greatly increase the number of fully-qualified joint officers available to serve in key positions on the combatant commands’ staffs. These officers reduce the need for service

component headquarters to provide service specific advice to that staff. State-of-the-art collaborative planning tools and improved automation and information technologies now allow direct links between both joint and service command and logistics elements in the United States and the forces operating overseas, further reducing the need for large forward service component headquarters elements. Additionally, the new responsibilities assigned to USACOM for training, integrating, and providing joint forces to other combatant commands duplicate much of what the current service component commands do. The vast majority of U.S. forces will be projected from the continental United States under the auspices of USACOM. The regional commands themselves will no longer have to orchestrate the efforts of four service components and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to get forces into theater. This is now presumably the responsibility of the joint force provider, but current organizational structure mitigates against full exercise of that responsibility.

Indeed, the primary mission requirement for combatant commands today extends beyond simple organization and support of U.S. military forces to deal with an identified potential military situation. They must also assist in a broad interagency effort to determine future theater objectives and what contribution military power can make to operational ways and means, while simultaneously accomplishing currently prescribed missions. The world is more complicated than in the recent past; more elements of national power must play in policy implementation. To gain the best advantage in today's joint and interagency world requires joint and interagency integration throughout the planning and execution process. What is needed is a multidimensional, joint and interagency planning and execution agency, not a one-dimensional, service component planning agent.

Military Service component headquarters, perhaps once vital, are now anachronisms, both unnecessary in the post-GNA-86 environment and ill-suited for effective policy implementation in the emerging international environment. Elimination of most of the existing subordinate headquarters of the regional combatant

commands will improve the effectiveness of those commands, more efficiently use defense resources, and potentially reduce overall resource requirements significantly. Those Title 10 responsibilities (organize, equip, train, resource, budget) which *must* be accomplished to some degree in-theater can be done at the combatant command staff level. In many cases, the expertise and capability already exists within the talented groups now found staffing the combatant commands. Where this is not the case, small service-expertise cells possessing the essential skills and abilities may need to be added to the consolidated joint staff directorates. Effective policy implementation can be assured by a combination of Operational Planning Groups and standing Joint Task Forces, which better accommodate the political-military realities of today and the future.

The proposed alignment of DoD regional commands and DoS regional bureaus is the skeletal system of a more effective U.S. foreign affairs and national security structure; the nervous system is the creation and incorporation of Operational Planning Groups. An Operational Planning Group is a team of knowledgeable theater-level planners brought together specifically to focus on a particular crisis or issue. Accordingly, the number of Operational Planning Groups active at any given time will vary according to the number of issues being worked in a particular AOR.

An Operational Planning Group is a “virtual corporation” that increases or decreases in size as the scope or intensity of the crisis or issue demands. Allowing for the efficient use of scarce resources, an Operational Planning Group is formed by bringing together individuals with the particular expertise and talents appropriate to the situation when and where needed to solve current, near-term, or long-range national security problems. OPGs are not, however, totally ad hoc organizations formed simply in times of crisis; instead each provides a permanent core of talented planning staff personnel to which germane additional expertise is added, either physically or electronically as the situation warrants. Headed by a Flag Officer or Ambassador, the OPG is comprised of interagency players from a wide variety of government, nongovernment, and coalition partner


organizations. It is specifically intended to integrate all instruments of U.S. foreign policy. Each Operational Planning Group will:

- Focus on accomplishment of a specific regional or functional mission,
- Bring the expertise of government and nongovernment interagency actors together with military strategic and operational planners and operators to improve the coordinated application of all elements of national power,
- Increase the knowledge and understanding of the military's operational capabilities and limitations among interagency players who increasingly have little or no experience with the military,
- Expose a larger number of interagency actors to the military's planning processes, and the military to the processes of other government and non-government organizations, perhaps thereby eventually encouraging greater long-range planning throughout the interagency community,<sup>19</sup> and
- Improve the transition from planning to execution. Although, as its name indicates, an Operational Planning Group is primarily a planning element, in some circumstances an OPG may actually become the Joint Task Force headquarters for control of mission execution.<sup>20</sup>

Joint Task Forces (JTFs) —flexible organizations of joint forces established on either an area or functional basis— have already proven to be effective controllers and employers of U.S. military power, and effective coordinators of interagency action. Standing Joint Task Forces will be the musculature of the new DoD combatant command structure, the sharp end of the spear, the primary executors of military support to U.S. policy. These JTFs should be formed around the current headquarters of operational level units, such as V Corps in Europe or Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. While responsible for harnessing the effects of U.S. resources, the Joint Task Force headquarters' primary focus is on external, rather than internal, mission requirements. The availability of modern information technology will allow the combatant command


staff or US-based organizations to perform the “housekeeping” and logistical tasks for the JTF which the service component headquarters formerly handled. Finally, the Joint Task Force is a more flexible organization than a single service component organization, more able to adjust quickly to changes in mission requirements. Thus, JTFs can ensure the effective execution of U.S. policy without the redundancy found in multiple service component headquarters.

An initial suggestion for the number of Operational Planning Groups and Standing Joint Task Forces for each of the five proposed regional combatant commands is provided in figures 12 through 16.




**Figure 12. Proposed USEUCOM OPGs and JTFs.**

U.S. European Command AOR aligned with DoS Bureau of European Affairs<sup>21</sup>




**Figure 13. Proposed USAFRICOM OPGs and JTFs.**

U.S. African Command AOR aligned with DoS Bureau of African Affairs




**Figure 14. Proposed USAMERICOM OPGs and JTFs.**

U.S. Americas Command AOR aligned with DoS Bureau of Inter-American Affairs<sup>22</sup>



**Figure 15. Proposed USNECOM OPGs and JTFs.**

U.S. Near East Command AOR aligned with DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 16. Proposed USFECOM OPGs and JTFs.**


U.S. Far East Command AOR aligned with DoS Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs<sup>24</sup>

If accomplished, the consolidation of the Title 10 responsibilities of the existing Military Service component headquarters with the combatant command staffs and the establishment of Operational Planning Groups and standing Joint Task Forces within the DoD regional combatant commands will improve interagency planning, will intensify the focus on operational needs, and will significantly reduce resource inefficiencies. Manpower and resource savings generated from the replacement of the large Cold War service component headquarters, if they exceed those necessary to create the Operational Planning Groups and reinforce either combatant command staffs or JTF headquarters, can be used to provide additional operational and tactical level forces — or to enhance the robustness of the diplomatic instrument of national power (which has been somewhat restricted of late due to financial limitations).

### **Extending the Reorganization to the DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

The Department of Defense functional commands, by their very nature, accomplishing their missions on a global basis, do not have geographic areas of responsibility. Accordingly, integration of their activities with other interagency activities must occur either through interaction at the national level or via coordination through the supported regional command. Thus there is no need to address functional combatant command alignment with the Department of State's regional political affairs bureaus, and consideration of possible integration of certain DoS functional bureaus is left for future phases of the total national security restructuring process. On the other hand, the arguments for creating and using OPGs and JTFs in the DoD regional commands appear to apply equally well in the arena of the functional combatant commands, which also possess numerous subordinate Military Service component headquarters (see figure 17).

The real issue for these command structures, therefore, is how to most efficiently organize them to reduce redundancy, exploit information technology, and make the best use of resources.




**Figure 17. Subordinate Commands  
of the DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

Two special factors bear on resolution of this issue. First, it should be noted that U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Space Command, and to a lesser degree the U.S. Transportation Command, are predominantly single service commands. Second, although U.S. Atlantic Command is a geographic command with an AOR, its more important mission is actually as a functional command, in that it is charged with overseeing the preparation and joint training of all conventional forces in the continental United States for service with the other regional commands. In this latter role USACOM's mission appears to duplicate many, though not all, of the responsibilities of the service headquarters with regard to conventional forces. Since much of this duplication with the service headquarters also exists for the other functional commands for their specialized forces, any restructuring of the functional commands should also consider the roles of the service headquarters. As was done for the regional combatant commands, three options will be examined.

**Option One.** This first option for restructuring the functional commands would achieve resource savings through consolidation,


and eliminate the duplication between the service departments and functional headquarters. This option (see figure 18) would



**Figure 18. Option One -- DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

combine the current USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM into a single headquarters. A standing JTF would control all the global-reach operating forces assigned to the command, and would be responsible for planning and executing operational missions with these forces worldwide in coordination with the affected regional command(s). The individual service headquarters would continue to perform all Title 10 functions and would reassume the force provider responsibilities currently tasked to USACOM. As such, they would be responsible for the training and stationing of all individual service forces in the United States not assigned to an active JTF. This option provides maximum resource savings, but is a potential step backwards in joint force preparation.


**Option Two.** A second option would be to create a combined USSPACECOM as in Option One, but retain the current USACOM's force-provider role and its subordinate service component headquarters (see figure 19) in the new USAMERICOM.



**Figure 19. Option Two -- DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

In this option, USAMERICOM's subordinate service component commands assume all service-related logistical support and coordination responsibilities, and supervise the preparation and training of all US-based forces not assigned to an active JTF. Thus, USAMERICOM retains the mission of being the primary force provider in addition to having geographic responsibilities.

**Option Three.** A third option is to consolidate USSTRATCOM into USSPACECOM as in Options One and Two, delete USAMERICOM's force provider role, and create a joint U.S. FORCES COMMAND (USFORCECOM) to act as force provider (see figure 20). This command would assume all responsibilities for stationing, preparation, and training of US-based forces not assigned to an active JTF. Without an AOR, this U.S. FORCES COMMAND can focus on training forces and providing services to the regional commands. USFORCECOM will also be charged with training and evaluating Operational Planning Groups and Joint Task Force Headquarters for the functional and regional commands. In support of this mission it will create and control a major planning and operational simulation and gaming center to assist in improving crisis action planning throughout the national security organizations.



**Figure 20. Option Three -- DoD Functional Combatant Commands.**

As already noted, the major drawback of Option One is that joint training and preparation of forces are likely to suffer, since the individual service headquarters' operations staffs are unlikely to put the same emphasis into joint training and simulations as would a combatant command CINC. The major drawback of Option Two is USAMERICOM's span of control. Either or both its geographic and force provider responsibilities are likely to suffer from insufficient focus. Option Three, on the other hand:

- Provides a strong focus on joint preparation and training since the force provider is a unified command with a joint perspective;
- Relieves the force provider of simultaneous responsibility for a geographic region; and
- Eliminates redundancies and potentially provides some resource savings which can be used to sustain or improve operational forces' capabilities.

## **Conclusions.**

When they say  
There is peace and security,  
then sudden destruction will come upon them,  
...  
and there will be no escape!  
...  
So let us not fall asleep as others do,  
but let us keep awake and be sober.

—1 Thessalonians 5:3-6<sup>25</sup>

Now is an opportune time to begin the restructuring of America's national security apparatus. The potential for resource savings, at a time when demand for scarce and declining resources is increasing, is enormous. But more importantly, a window of opportunity has swung wide open. The Information Age and global communications allow the United States to use advanced technology to push the American agenda. At the same time strategic risk — frequently associated with dramatic change — is reduced. And the need to increase interagency coordination and meet the challenges of the newly emerging socio-cultural-diplomatic-economic-environmental-military universe is clear. So now is the time, during this —potentially short— pause in the military threat situation, to reorganize DoD and DoS elements for better convergence of all the instruments of foreign policy.

The restructuring of the DoD regional combatant commands, DoS regional bureaus, and the DoD functional combatant commands recommended in this paper will improve national security policy implementation effectiveness by increasing the joint and interagency focus, and will make more efficient use of national security resources. Some may argue that:

- The task of a complete restructuring of the DoD combatant military commands and modification of the DoS regional bureaus is just too vast to be attempted,

- If such a restructuring is attempted, the restructuring package chosen will be piecemealed,
- Turf battles between affected organizations will lead to open bickering among the national security leadership, or
- Savings gained from the combatant command restructuring will not be used to increase military effectiveness, but will be diverted to other national programs.

The first argument can be regarded as essentially irrelevant. Restructuring of the national security organizations will eventually be forced upon the leadership by resource constraints, as the demand for scarce national resources continues to grow. The choice is either to attempt to choose how to change now, or have future change in some form forced upon us.

The latter three arguments may prove true to some degree, but their impact can be reduced by prompt, rapid action. And in any event the proposed structures, if adopted, provide advantages which more than offset these potential outcomes. Foremost among the advantages of the proposed restructuring:

- The total national security team will be better prepared to face complex problems on present and future international battlefields.
- Alignment of the DoD regional combatant commands with the DoS political affairs bureaus and incorporation of the Operational Planning Group concept will establish interagency operations as a focal point throughout the training, planning, and execution cycles.
- Designated Joint Task Forces and Operational Planning Groups will be trained and certified by a single unified command. Charging USFORCECOM with evaluating the operating JTFs for the regional commands will ensure a uniformly high standard of joint training in those headquarters and their JTF service components. Every step of the


combatant military command structure thus will become more effective joint organizations.

- More meaningful joint training, joint and combined exercises, operational gaming, and crisis planning will speed the development of advanced collaborative planning tools.
- Eliminating or streamlining many of the current combatant commands' subordinate command headquarters may allow the redirection of some personnel spaces to more productive areas with the operating forces. The headquarters' replacements (augmented combatant command staffs, Operational Planning Groups, and standing Joint Task Forces) will be more effective at planning and executing operations in the interagency world.
- Staffing Operational Planning Groups with the most talented and competent interagency personnel will ensure that an integrated national security policy perspective is incorporated into every operation from situation assessment through final execution. This complete interagency integration is the logical and necessary follow-on to joint planning and operations.
- Accomplishment of the proposed restructuring will mean that the U.S. national security team will more effectively implement national security policy.

## **Recommendations.**


First, that the Department of Defense and the Department of State study and develop measures to implement a restructuring of the regional national security structures along the lines of five DoD regional combatant commands, each aligned with a single Department of State regional bureau (see figure 21).

Second, that the Department of Defense and the Military Services study and develop measures to implement a restructuring of the DoD combatant command structure incorporating four functional combatant commands, and incorporating the combination of



**Figure 21. Recommended Aligned DoD and DoS Regional Organizations.**

subordinate Joint Task Forces and Operational Planning Groups within both functional and regional commands (see figure 22).



## **Figure 22. Recommended DoD Combatant Command Structure.**

Third, (since, with appropriate study, it may be possible to extend the concepts discussed here to other portions of the DoD, the DoS, and the larger interagency national security structure) that the President direct that a Task Force, chaired by the Vice President and supported by appropriate bipartisan Congressional effort, be established to examine alternatives to strengthen the effectiveness of the *overall* U.S. organization for national security.

## **ENDNOTES**

1. Excerpt from Address by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, West Point, New York, October 25, 1996.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF), Washington, DC, February 24, 1995, p. IV-5.
3. For more information on the evolution to today's command structure, see Chapter 5, Unified and Specified Commands, Defense Organization: The Need For Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1985, pp. 275-282. Also, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996.
4. Defense Organization: The Need For Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1985, p. 2.
5. The UCP is "The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. (Joint Pub 1-02)." U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF), Washington, DC, February 24, 1995, p. GL-9. The latest UCP was approved on 28 December 1995, and provided to the CINCs for implementation in a memorandum from the Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 January 1996.
6. While all combatant commands have potential force provider roles to other commands, U.S. Atlantic Command is unique in having this as perhaps its primary role. USACOM is responsible for the preparation and provision of all CONUS-based conventional forces. In addition, it is assigned a large geographic area of responsibility.
7. U.S. Department of State Structure and Organization Home Page, U.S. DoS Bureau of Public Affairs, download 2:21 p.m. 21 Feb. 1997 from [http://www.state.gov/www/about\\_state/dosstruc.html](http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/dosstruc.html).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

10. Although the DoS geographic bureau alignment is essentially unchanged, revised priorities and/or resource constraints have dictated the closure of at least 17 U.S. diplomatic posts, and the projected elimination of perhaps as many as 25 others. See key decisions of the Secretary of State's Strategic Management Initiative on the DoS Home Page at URL [http://www.state.gov/www/about\\_state/dosstruc.html](http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/dosstruc.html).

11. Defense Organization: The Need For Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1985, p. 2.

12. John Bartlett, *Familiar Quotations*, 9th ed., Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1901. Columbia University on-line edition at <http://www.columbia.edu/acis/bartleby/bartlett/index.html>.

13. The redesignation of U.S. Atlantic Command as USACOM with additional force provider and joint training responsibilities is an example of an attempt at modification, as is the creation of the offices dealing with the newly independent states in the DoS Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs.

14. Excerpt from Address by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, West Point, New York, October 25, 1996.

15. Because the Department of State currently includes Canadian affairs in its Bureau which deals with European affairs, but this neither fits current world diplomatic, political, or economic realities nor eases the creation of effective command and control arrangements.

16. Additionally, if the DoS bureau system was retained in its current configuration, the DoD regional command created to be responsible for North and South America would have to deal with the Inter-American Affairs bureau and with the Canadian desk subordinate to the separate European and Canadian Affairs bureau. Perhaps more significantly, the DoS Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs would have to deal with two independent CINCs.

17. The idea of consolidating responsibility for assisting/defusing African and South American humanitarian and civil-military relations situations in a single command was originally suggested to the authors by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

18. See, for example, Cultural Explanations, "The man in the Baghdad cafe", *The Economist*, November 9, 1996, pp. 23-26.

19. At the National Defense University's Topical Symposium on the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act held in December 1996, it was noted that currently a potentially serious imbalance in long-range planning exists within the Federal government. The DoD has institutionalized and become very effective at such planning. The rest of the government, unfortunately, lags behind. In the national

security arena, for example, neither the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, nor the Central Intelligence Agency have created any process comparable to DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review.

20. Precedence exists. An instance of a primarily planning headquarters transforming to become the executive headquarters can be found in the COSSAC planners in the European theater in W.W.II. The Halsey/Spruance/Fletcher/Nimitz naval and amphibious operations of WW II provide another example, with frequent rotation of planning staffs into operational command and back again for different portions of the Central Pacific campaign.

21. The "DoS Bureau of European Affairs" is the current Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, less the Office of Canadian Affairs which is transferred to the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

22. The "DoS Bureau of Inter-American Affairs" is the current Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, plus the Office of Canadian Affairs formerly in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, plus the appropriate offices, if any, for U.S. territories and possessions formerly in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

23. The "DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs" is the current Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, plus the offices dealing with affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan formerly in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs.

24. The "DoS Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs" is a combination of: (1) The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, less any offices dealing with U.S. territories or possessions (transferred to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs), and (2) The Bureau of South Asian Affairs, less the offices dealing with affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan (transferred to Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs).

25. *The Holy Bible*, New Revised Standard Version, Catholic Bible Press, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee, 1990.